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A Centre for Competition and Regulation Newsletter

The National Law School Centre for Competition and Regulation
(CCR) has been instituted with the intention of providing research,
training and consultation in the area of competition law and
economic regulation. It aims to bring together various
stakeholders such as regulators, academicians, practitioners
and industry to provide for better understanding and
critical thinking of current law and policy. Efficient
and timely law, policy and its enforcement is a
crucial driver of economic growth and the
centre is driven by these
concerns.
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A CURRENT LOOK AT FOREIGN CARTELS AND THE
UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
Prof. C. Paul Rogers III#
price fixing scheme which, it was alleged, caused higher vitamin prices in
the U.S. as well as other countries such
as Ecuador. The Court ruled that U.S.
purchasers could bring a Sherman Act
claim under the FTAIA but that buyers in other countries could not since
their harm was foreign to the United
States. In interpreting the statute, the
Court held that the act sets forth a
general rule placing all non-import activity involving foreign commerce outside of the reach of the Sherman Act.
But, the Court noted, the act ―brings
such conduct back within the Sherman Act‘s reach if the restraint at issue has a ―direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable‖ anticompetitive
impact on U.S. commerce.6

The United States‘ Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), enacted in 1982, is designed to set the
framework for determining if and
when U.S. antitrust laws have jurisdiction over anticompetitive conduct involving commerce foreign to the United States.1 While excluding U.S. import commerce from its reach, it seeks
to both clarify and limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws, perhaps in partial deference to
foreign concerns about the reach of
those laws to competitive conduct
abroad. It is far, however, from an example of clarity in drafting.2 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has described it as a ―web of
words‖3 while the Third Circuit noted
that it was ―inelegantly phrased.‖4

Litigation involving the FTAIA has
spiked in the last decade or so as the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has
increasingly prosecuted foreign-based
cartels, spurring many coattail civil
lawsuits in addition. In a number of
investigations, the DOJ has targeted
foreign suppliers of component parts
that were incorporated by other companies into finished products assembled overseas but later imported for
sale to U.S. customers. Leading examples include TFT-LCD panels for finished products such as televisions,

The U.S. Supreme Court has considered the applicability of the FTAIA
only in its 2004 F. Hoffman-LaRoche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. decision.5 The
case involved a world-wide vitamin
1 15

U.S.C. §6a.

2 See

e.g. C. Paul Rogers III, Cross-Border Mergers and Antitrust:
Jurisdiction, Enforcement and Cooperation Issues, in Cross-Border
Mergers and Acquisitions and the Law (Norbert Horn, ed.
2001), 361, n.10.
3 United

States v. Hui Hsiung, No. 12-10492, 2015 WL 400550,
at *9 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2015), amending 758 F.3d 1074 (9th
Cir. 2014).
4 Carpet

Group Int’l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62,
69 (3d Cir. 2000).
5 542

U.S. 155 (2004).

6 Id.
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notebook computers, and cell phones
and various parts assemblies used to
make automobiles.

have applied the statute inconsistently.
For example, the Ninth Circuit has
held that ―direct‖ under the statute
means ―as an immediate consequence‖ with no ―intervening developments.‖11 In contrast, the Second
and Seventh Circuits have rejected the
Ninth Circuit‘s test, instead defining
direct as having a ―reasonable proximate cause nexus.‖12

Often at issue is whether the foreign
component cartel had the required
―direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect‖ on US commerce.7
The DOJ‘s position in those cases is
typically that U.S. consumers were
harmed because inflated cartel prices
for the components paid for abroad
were incorporated into higher prices
for the finished products that were
sold in the United States.8 It is concerned, however, that interpretations
of the FTAIA that preclude the Sherman Act from reaching foreign component part cartels unduly limit its
ability to protect U.S. consumers from
competitive harm.9

The nexus test has proven difficult to
apply and one group of commentators has argued that in practice it often
devolves ―into subjective metaphysical
analysis.‖13 But with respect to component part cartels, there is always the
argument that effects on U.S. Commerce are not direct where a price
fixed component is incorporated overseas into a finished product that is
eventually imported into the United
States. Thus, under either test, a U.S.
plaintiff suing a foreign component
part cartel cannot be assured that it
can meet FTAIA requirements.

Although lower courts have been
mindful of the Supreme Court‘s admonition that Congress intended that
the FTAIA ―clarify, perhaps to limit,
but not to expand in any significant
way, the Sherman Act‘s scope as applied to foreign commerce,‖10 they

The FTAIA‘s seemingly intractability is
perhaps best illustrated by the recent
Motorola litigation before the Seventh
Circuit. It involved claims based on
foreign sales of price-fixed LCD panels incorporated into cellphones that
were then imported into the United
States. In earlier litigation the DOJ
had alleged that the overcharges on

7 Other

frequently recurring issues arising under the FTAIA
include (1) whether, assuming a direct effect on U.S. commerce, that effect ―gives rise to‖ the plaintiff‘s Sherman Act
claim (Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162), and (2) whether the foreign cartel conduct directly involves U.S. import commerce
and thus is excluded from the requirements of the statute
by its express terms. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683
F.3d 845, 855-56 (7th Cir. 2012).
8 Leon

B. Greenfield, Steven F. Cherry, Perry A. Lange, and
Jacquelyn L. Stanley, Foreign Component Cartels and the U.S.
Antitrust Laws: A First Principle Approach, Antitrust (Spring
2015), 18.

10 Id.

at 169.

11Huising,

No 12-10514, slip op. at 40; United States v. LSL
Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2004).

9 Brief

for the United States and the FTC as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Panel Reh‘g or Reh‘g En Banc at 10, Motorola
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 14-8003 (7th Cir.
Apr. 24, 2014), 2014 WL 1878995, at *10.83 F.3d 845, 85657 (7th Cir. 2012).

12 See

Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395,
410 (2d Cir. 2014) and Minn-Chem, at 856-57.
13 Greenfield,
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et. al, at 21.
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those panels entering the U.S. exceeded $500 million.14

nents directly from the conspirators
abroad. According to the court, its
harm was suffered abroad when it
purchased the price-fixed panels
abroad, but that harm was not dependent on the domestic effect of increased cell phone prices.19

In Motorola I the court first held that
the targeted conduct did not have a
direct effect on U.S. commerce, but
subsequently vacated the opinion.15
Then in Motorola II the same panel reversed itself on the direct effect test,
holding that if prices of the components were fixed, the effect on U.S.
commerce would meet the test for
purposes of the FTAIA.16 But it focused additionally on the second domestic effects question under the statute – whether, assuming a direct effect
on U.S. commerce, those effects give
rise ―to an antitrust cause of action
under the Sherman Act.‖17 In doing
so, it held that the FTAIA precluded
plaintiff ‘s claims because the domestic
effect of a conspiracy to fix component part prices did not ―give rise‖ to
a Sherman Act claim. The court reasoned that although the domestic effect of the conspiracy was increased
cell phone prices in the U.S., that is
not what harmed the plaintiff, which
was a wholly owned foreign subsidiary
of the American parent company.18 It
had purchased the price fixed compo-

In support of its holding, the Motorola
II court referenced the Supreme
Court‘s concern expressed in Empagran about the risk of excessive extraterritorial application of U.S. law
interfering ―with a foreign nation‘s
ability independently to regulate its
own affairs.‖20 Of course, that concern for international comity is a
prime motivation for the FTAIA itself.21 The proof is in the pudding,
however. That is, it is the American
courts which are left with the task of
interpreting and applying an admittedly poorly drafted and confusing statute. As such, it seems that they are
the ultimate purveyors of comity.
Part of the judicial function of course
is to provide guidance and predictability. But with the circuit split after
Motorola II, there is currently little of
19 Id.

at 820. The court also held that Motorola‘s claims did
not fall within the import trade exception to the FTAIA,
since Motorola, not the defendants, were the importers of
the price-fixed goods. Id. at 818. This holding conflicts
with the Ninth Circuit, which held that the fact that the
defendants were not themselves ―importers‖ was immaterial. Huising, 2015 WL 400550, at *14.

14See

Brief for the United States at 22, United States v. AU
OptronicsCorp., No. 12-10492 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2013).
15Motorola

Mobility LLC. v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola I),
746 F.3d 842, 844-45 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014) (Posner, J.),
vacated and rehearing granted, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 120704
(7th Cir. July 1, 2014).

20 Motorola

16Motorola

Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II),
775 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2015).
17Id.

II, 775 F.3d at 824 (quoting Empagran, 542 U.S. at

165).
21 Ellen

Meriwether, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA: If Not
Here, Then Where?, Antitrust, Spring 2015, 13. 21 Further,
Motorola II‘s restriction of the reach of the FTAIA‘s import
exception adds another potential layer of defense for foreign cartels. See note 19, supra, and Motorola II, 775 F.3d at
818.

at 820.

18 Motorola

argued that it functioned with its subsidiaries as
a single enterprise, but the court ruled them legally distinct
and that it could not pretend that its foreign subsidiaries
were divisions rather than subsidiaries. Id. at 822.
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either for cases involving component
part price-fixing abroad. Motorola II
certainly restricts the reach of U.S. antitrust laws to those conspiracies and
adds additional hurdles for the DOJ
and private plaintiffs seeking relief for
domestic harms. In addition to the
direct and substantial effects requirement, plaintiffs must be prepared to
meet a narrow, restrictive ―domestic
effects‖ test to satisfy the FTAIA.22

Nonetheless Motorola II has limited the
reach of Sherman Act claims to foreign component part cartels. But that
case may have created a circuit split
and it is far from clear how other circuits might handle the same type of
claim. On June 15, 2015, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in both
Motorola II and the Ninth Circuit‘s
Hsiung case, so we are not going to get
a definitive answer anytime soon.

But before one asserts that Motorola II
has effectively swept away all U.S. antitrust claims against foreign component part price-fixers, it is important
to remember the Supreme Court‘s admonition in Empagran that it matters
who the plaintiff is.23 For example, if
Motorola had made its purchase decisions and executed purchase orders in
the U.S. rather than abroad through a
foreign subsidiary, the result might
have been different.24 Further, the
DOJ, while is concerned about the effect of cases like Motorola II on its
ability to criminally prosecute foreign
based component part cartels, has typically asserted jurisdiction through the
FTAIA‘s import commerce exception.25

Motorola II may have shifted the focus
to the domestic effects analysis and
away from the direct effects requirement, which could perhaps soften the
supposed circuit spit since the FTAIA
requires both. As a result, it may be
that in declining to hear the case, the
Supreme Court did not see a circuit
split.26

22 542

In any event, judicial application of
the FTAIA seems to have produced
more questions than answers. While
ideally the law should create certainty,
the combination of an unartfully
drafted statute, differing judicial interpretations of that statute, and the
somewhat amorphous concept of
comity all combine to produce a great
deal of uncertainty about the application of the FTAIA to foreign component part cartels.

U.S. at 170-71.

23 In

that instance, the goods would have been import commerce and thus presumably within the FTAIA‘s import
exception but whether the ―gives rise to‖ domestic effect
standard under Motorola II would be satisfied is still questionable.
24 In that instance, the goods would have been import commerce and thus presumably within the FTAIA‘s import
exception but whether the ―gives rise to‖ domestic effect
standard under Motorola II would be satisfied is still questionable

# Author is Professor of Law and Former
Dean, SMU Dedman School of Law; Of
Counsel, Locke Lord, Dallas, Texas
25 Hsiung,
26 The

No. 12-10514, slip op. 35-36.

U.S. Supreme Court does not give its reasons for
denying a petition for certiorari.
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